
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
The Effect of School Construction on Test Scores, 
School Enrollment, and Home Prices




The Effect of School Construction on 





















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











The Effect of School Construction on 
Test Scores, School Enrollment, and Home Prices
* 
 
This paper provides new evidence on the effect of school construction projects on home 
prices, academic achievement, and public school enrollment. Taking advantage of the 
staggered implementation of a comprehensive school construction project in a poor urban 
district, we find that, by six years after building occupancy, $10,000 of per-student investment 
in school construction raised reading scores for elementary and middle school students by 
0.027 standard deviations. For a student receiving the average treatment intensity this 
corresponds to a 0.21 standard deviation increase. School construction also raised home 
prices and public school enrollment in zoned neighborhoods. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  I21, I22, H75, R30 
  





Seth Zimmerman  
Department of Economics 
Yale University 
37 Hillhouse Ave. 
New Haven, CT 06520 
USA 
E-mail: seth.zimmerman@yale.edu   
  
                                                 
* The authors wish to thank the New Haven Public Schools (NHPS) for access to the student data 
used in this study. We are particularly indebted to William Clark, Laoise King, Catherine McCaslin, and 
Garth Harries. We thank Daniel Haim of NHPS and Michael DePalma and Robert Lynn of Gilbane Inc. 
for details on the school construction projects described here, and Kevin Moriarty for additional data 
assistance. We thank Joseph Altonji, Prashant Bharadwaj, Raj Chetty, Justine Hastings, Amanda 
Kowalski, Fabian Lange, Richard Mansfield, Alexandre Mas and seminar participants at the Yale 
University Labor Workshop for their comments and suggestions. All errors are our own. The research 
reported here was not the result of a for-pay consulting relationship. 1 Motivation
1.1 Motivation and summary
Investment in school infrastructure is one of the principle ways in which federal, state,
and local governments develop physical capital in U.S. communities. In 2008, public ex-
penditures on school construction, land, and building acquisition totaled more than $58
billion. Of this amount, between $20 and $40 billion was spent on the construction of
approximately 2,000 new school buildings.1 This represents not just a large share of total
education-related expenditures– roughly ten percent– but a large share of overall infras-
tructure expenditure: in 2004, public investment in school infrastructure was $75.9 billion,
nearly as much as the $99.7 billion public investment in all forms of transportation infras-
tructure, including roads, mass transit, and aviation.2
In this paper, we present new evidence on the causal effect of school infrastructure invest-
ment on student test scores, neighborhood-speciﬁc public school enrollment, and housing
prices. We take advantage of a unique natural experiment in which a poor, urban school
district embarked upon a comprehensive 15-year, $1.4 billion school construction program
(believed to be the largest per-capita construction program in the nation over the period)
to produce estimates that are unbiased by the endogeneity of school construction to school
characteristics. Our empirical strategy uses the fact that occupancy dates varied widely
across schools, with the ﬁrst school completed in 1998 and the last slated to be completed
in 2014. Speciﬁcally, we use a difference-in-differences comparison of test scores, home
prices, and public school attendance in neighborhoods on different construction schedules.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to establish the link between school
construction and changes in test scores and enrollment patterns.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that the school construction program led to sustained gains in
reading scores for elementary and middle school students. Trends in reading scores are ﬂat
in the years leading up to construction, but turn upwards in the year of construction and
continue to increase for at least the next six years. By the sixth year following the year
of construction, student scores rise by 0.027 standard deviations for each $10,000 of per-
student construction expenditure. For a student receiving the average level of construction
1Estimates on expenditures vary across sources. See report from the NCEF - National Clearinghouse for
Educational Facilities and Public Education Finances 2008.
2Source: CBO – Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2008.
1expenditure, this corresponds to a total score gain of 0.21 standard deviations. These gains
are large, but not implausibly so; roughly speaking, they are of similar magnitude to those
experienced by students who enroll in high-performing charter schools.3 There is weak
evidence of a corresponding increase in math scores.
Housingpricesandneighborhoodpublicschoolenrollmentalsorespondpositivelytoschool
construction. Elementaryandmiddleschoolconstructionraisedhomevaluesby1.3percent
per $10,000 of per-student expenditure, and the number of school zone residents attending
public school by up to 4.4 percent per $10,000. As with the estimated reading score ef-
fects, the timing of these changes coincides with the occupancy of completed buildings.
Taken together, our student outcome, home price, and enrollment results suggest that fam-
ilies, and in particular families with children, place a high value on school infrastructure
investment. If families only valued infrastructure insofar as it improved education produc-
tion, this would imply that raising school value added by 0.1 standard deviations would
raise neighborhood home prices by 4.7 percent, and enrollment of neighborhood residents
in public schools by 16.2 percent. Since school construction also changes neighborhood
amenities in other ways, these values should be interpreted as upper bounds on the true
elasticities.
Our ﬁndings beg the question of why school construction raises test scores. Possible path-
ways include the direct effects of new facilities on pedagogy, effects on student and teacher
motivationduringschoolhours, and effects on students’and parents’motivationto investin
academic production at home. Though our empirical work does not allow us to distinguish
between these channels, a survey of district principals indicates that student and teacher
motivation were at least as important as direct pedagogical effects for improving academic
outcomes.
1.2 Contributions to the literature
We build upon and link two distinct strands of literature. The ﬁrst deals directly with the
effects of school infrastructure investment. There are few compelling estimates of how
infrastructure expenditures affect student performance. In a review of literature on the
3Lottery-based evaluations of the effects of attending high-performing KIPP charter schools suggest ef-
fects of between 0.12 standard deviations per year of enrollment for reading and 0.35 standard deviations for
math (Angrist et al. 2011). Between 6th and 8th grade, students enrolled in Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ)
schools experience reading score gains of one quarter to third of a standard deviation and math score gains of
0.8 standard deviations relative to HCZ non-participants (Dobbie and Fryer 2010).
2education production function, Hanushek (1997) reports that of 91 correlational studies
that examine the relationship between facility quality and student performance, only nine
percent found a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship, while ﬁve percent found a
statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship.4 Since facility quality is closely associated
with other observable and unobservable inputs into education production, the absence of
consistent ﬁndings is difﬁcult to interpret. Duﬂo (2001) uses a difference-in-differences
approach to obtain plausibly causal estimates of the effects of a large Indonesian school
construction program on educational attainment and labor market outcomes. Because her
paper focuses on the construction of schools where none had existed before, there is little
reason to think results would apply in the US, where the main challenges are those of
renovation and rebuilding.
Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010), henceforth CFR, provide estimates that are both
plausibly causal and relevant to US policy. CFR employ a regression discontinuity around
the outcomes of school district-level votes on the bond issues used to ﬁnance school con-
struction projects to estimate the effects of school construction spending in California on
homeprices and test scores. They ﬁnd that a dollarof expenditureon school facilities raises
home prices by roughly $1.50, leading to an average home price increase of between 7 and
10 percent by six years after bond passage. They do not ﬁnd strong effects for student test
scores. CFR’s research design has two important limitations. First, CFR use district-level
third and fourth grade test scores to measure score effects. Since district-level expenditures
are a noisy measure of theexpenditures we would expect to improveoutcomes for third and
fourth graders (e.g., expenditures on elementary schools as opposed to high schools), it is
likely that their estimates of test score effects are biased downward towards zero. Second,
the cost of identiﬁcation via regression discontinuity is that estimates cannot necessarily be
extrapolated to districts that are not on the electoral margin of bond passage. If electoral
outcomes are a function of residents’ beliefs about the beneﬁts of school construction, ef-
fects in marginal districts will likely differ systematically from effects for districts in which
bonds pass or fail by a comfortable amount. In sum, CFR show convincingly that the
residents of electorally marginal districts value school construction, but questions remain
about test score effects generally, and about home price and test score effects for different
types of infra-marginal districts. Of particular interest are poor urban districts, because
these districts are frequent targets of policy interventions aimed at improving school qual-
423 percent reported statistically insigniﬁcant positive relationships, 19 percent reported statistically sig-
niﬁcant negative relationships, and 44 percent reported relationships of indeterminate sign.
3ity and also tend to have the low-quality existing facilities.5 We establish for the ﬁrst time
a relationship between school construction and test scores, and do so in the context of a
poor urban district with baseline facility quality similar to that in other urban districts in
the state.
The second strand of literature examines the way housing markets price the quality of
local schools. Black (1999) uses discontinuities in the prices of homes on the borders be-
tween school districts to estimate the price effects of differences between school-average
test scores. Bayer et al. (2007) nests this identiﬁcation strategy within a model of housing
demand and makes the observation that much of the observed price gap is attributable to
endogenous socioeconomic segregation along district boundaries, not to test scores per se.
One implication of the ﬁnding that school quality has an independent effect on the housing
market is that changes in school qualityshould set off a dynamicprocess of residential sort-
ing and changes in home prices. This is how the socioeconomic stratiﬁcation along zone
boundary lines reported in Bayer et al. comes into existence. But because both Black and
Bayer et al. estimate static models of housing demand, they cannot observe this process as
it unfolds. We use panel data on home prices, public school enrollment, and test scores to
document dynamic changes in education production, home prices, and residency patterns
in response to the school construction intervention. Our results indicate that changes in
home prices, school enrollment among neighborhood residents, and education production
all begin at the time of occupancy. Housing markets do not appear to ‘price in’ construc-
tion projects in advance of building occupancy. School construction dramatically raises
school attendance rates among school zone residents, and students who move to neighbor-
hoods following school construction have observable characteristics associated with higher
test score performance. Our ﬁndings on sorting into school zones are consistent with the
socioeconomic stratiﬁcation observed in Bayer et al.
We also add to this literature by examining price responses to changes in education pro-
duction as opposed to aggregate school scores. One limitation of Black and Bayer et al.
is that both papers use average scores within school attendance zones as their measure of
5Filardo (2006) found that rates of investment in new infrastructure were twice as high in rich urban
districts as in poor urban districts between 1995 to 2004. Evidence of differential investment can be seen in
the heterogeneity of infrastructure quality across schools: 43 percent of schools in which 75 or more percent
of students are eligible for free lunch use portable buildings as classrooms, in contrast with 27 percent of
schools in which less than 35 percent of students are free-lunch eligible (Source: NCES Digest of Education
Statistics : Table 101.) If the marginal returns to investment in infrastructure are decreasing in the quality of
existing infrastructure, then poor districts will beneﬁt disproportionately from school construction.
4school quality. Zone-level averages represent a mix of the causal effect of zoned schools
(i.e., education production)on scores for studentslivingin the neighborhoodand the under-
lying observable and unobservable test score determinants of the students attending school
within the zone. Parents trying to optimize over education production will be interested
in the causal portion of the average but not the portion that is tied to selection. We use
the school construction natural experiment to identify changes in education production at
the school zone level, and link these changes to increases in home prices. Because school
construction may make neighborhoods more desirable in other ways, our estimates should
be interpreted only as upper bounds on the true elasticities of home prices with respect to
education production.We believe they nevertheless constitute an important ﬁrst attempt at
pricing educational production.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the school district and the school
construction program. In section 3, we present a theoretical model that we use to guide and
interpret our empirical speciﬁcations. In section 4, we describe the student and home price
data we use to conduct our analysis. Sections 6 through 8 present our empirical ﬁndings on
the home price, residency, and test score effects of school construction. Section 9 discusses
the impact of school construction on student behavior, and describes the results of our
survey of school principals. Section 10 concludes.
2 The natural experiment
2.1 The school district
Our project focuses on the publicschool systemin New Haven, Connecticut, which we will
refer to as NHPS or the District. New Haven is one of the largest districts in Connecticut
and is similarto manyurban schooldistrictsin theUnitedStates. Thestudentsmostlycome
from poor families and overwhelmingly belong to minority groups that have traditionally
lagged in educational outcomessuch as graduation rates and test scores. The Districthas an
enrollment of approximately 22,000 students, of whom more than 80 percent are eligible
for free lunch and approximately 90 percent are either black or Hispanic. One out of four
students speaks a language other than English at home. High school dropout rates are
triple the state average and test scores are substantially lower than those in the rest of the
state.Table 1 summarizesthedemographicsofthestudentsinthedistrictand contraststhem
to state averages in 2009.
5In Connecticut, poorurban districts typically have infrastructure of lower quality than other
districts. Early in the school construction program, NHPS’ facilities were roughly compa-
rable to those of other in-state urban districts. In 2001, public schools in New Haven and
Hartford, anotherurban district in Connecticut, were on average well over50 years old, and
in both cities more than half of schools reported problems related to basic service systems
such as heating, air conditioning, plumbing, and lighting, compared to less than one third
of schools in Connecticut as a whole.6






Free Lunch 80.5% 32.9%
English Language Learns 11.9% 5.3%
English Not Spoken at Home 25.5% 13.1%
At Goal or Proﬁcient (CMT) 43.0% 69.0%
Source: Connecticut Department of Education.
CMT : Connecticut Mastery Test is a standardized test score given to all children in
grades 3 to 8.
2.2 The school construction project
In contrast to many urban districts, NHPS has had the political and ﬁnancial backing to
enact an ambitious infrastructure investment program. An important contributor to the suc-
cessful execution of this project was the availability of federal and state ﬁnancing: the
District paid for only 23 percent of the total cost of buildings completed by 2010. The
School Construction Project (SCP) had a dramatic affect on primary- and secondary-school
infrastructure across the city. The ﬁrst SCP school was completed in 1998, and the last is
6The Connecticut Departmentof Educationcollects informationon school infrastructureby surveyingthe
school principles. Table A-I shows the frequency with which principals rated service items such as heating,
plumbing and air conditioning as either fair or poor in New Haven, Hartford, and Connecticut as a whole in
2001 and 2009.
6scheduled to be completed by 2014. Projected total spending is $1.4 billion, with $1.1 bil-
lion spent on projects that had been completed by 2010. Of 42 school buildings,7 12 had
been rebuilt completely by 2010, and 18 had been renovated. An additional seven were
under construction or under design. The remaining ﬁve buildings, all of which house inter-
district magnet or small K-1 schools, will not be rebuilt or renovated. School renovations
were generally substantial: mean expenditure on renovated schools was $33 million, com-
pared to a mean expenditure of $38 million on the rebuilt schools (all dollar values refer
to 2005 dollars). The project served students at all educational levels: of nine high schools
in the district, ﬁve had been rebuilt or renovated and occupied by 2010, with an additional
high school in the construction stage. Similarly, of 33 total elementary or middle schools,
25 had been rebuilt or renovated and occupied by 2010, with work on an additional six in
the planning or construction phase. The top two panels of Table A -2 describe the scope
of the SCP.
Though the changes made to schools varied depending on the condition of the existing
school, SCP administrators did target a number of areas for improvement at all schools.
One priority was heating and air conditioning. Prior to the SCP, many schools did not have
air conditioning, and some had inadequate heating. A second was classroom technology.
Classrooms in new and renovated schools were designed to facilitate the use of computers,
and science and media facilities for school-wide use were also improved. A third was
community access. SCP administrators designed gyms, playgrounds, and meeting spaces
to allow for use by community members as well as students. A fourth was to decrease
energy and maintenance costs. A ﬁfth and slightly more abstract goal of the SCP was to
make schools more ‘livable’ through subtler changes in design. The design of new school
buildings often allowed for more natural light than in the old buildings, and a portion of the
budget for each school was allocated to public artwork. For a more detailed description of
several of the school construction projects, see the Supplemental Appendix.
School expansion was not among the primary goals of the SCP. In fact, the SCP took place
in a time of declining overall demand for classroom space in the District: our data show
that District enrollment has been in decline since at least the 2002-2003 school year, before
which only four projects were completed. Nor did the SCP seek to change the allocation
of students across the district. There were no changes in school zone boundaries over the
7This count omits charter schools and transitional schools for at-risk youth, and counts each address
separately for schools with multiple addresses.
7period. One consequence of the neutrality of the SCP with respect to enrollment was that
new and renovated buildings typically did not offer much more classroom space than the
facilities they replaced. Among the sixteen projects for which we were able to recover
pre- and post-completion classroom square footage, the median change was less than seven
percent. Classroom space fell by 6.5 percent in the District’s best-performing school.
The SCP had a pronounced effect on the quality of the school environment in the District.
One way to see this is to track changes in the quality of District schools and compare them
to changes at the state level and in other urban districts. Between 2001 and 2009, the
percentage of schools reporting failures in basic services like air conditioning and lighting
fell from 32 to 18 percent at the state level, and from 54 to 30 percent in Hartford, another
poor district in Connecticut. The percentage of NHPS schools reporting such failures fell
from 53 to 14 percent. The SCP pushed the quality of NHPS infrastructure from far below
the state average to somewhat above it.8
2.3 Selection of schools in the SCP
Our goal is to identify the effects of school construction on community and student out-
comes using a difference-in-differences approach. It is therefore of critical importance for
the internal validity of our analysis that school construction not be a result of student or
community choices. For instance, if schools were chosen for renovation based on pro-
jected performance on state tests, our estimates of the effects of construction would likely
be biased. Our results would be similarly compromised if the SCP only placed schools in
neighborhoods where crime was already dropping.
Fortunately, discussions with SCP administrators and empirical investigation indicate that
the process by which schools were chosen was largely exogenous to community-speciﬁc
factors. First, it is important to note that the comprehensive nature of the SCP rendered
the question of which schools should be renovated irrelevant; instead, the key question
adminstrators faced was how to choose the order of construction. SCP administrators have
stated to the authors that, with the exception of the ﬁrst few schools, the determinants of
construction order were primarily logistical and design hurdles, not community or student
characteristics or demands. This claim is consistent with what we observe in the data. As
shown in Figure 1, there is no discernible geographic pattern to the order in which schools
8See Table A -1.
8were constructed. Nor do schools built or renovated in the early phases of the SCP differ
from schools constructed in the project’s later phases in terms of student demographics.
Table 2 compares students in schools constructed prior to 2006 (the approximate midpoint
oftheprojectintermsofcompletedbuildings)to studentsinschoolsconstructedafter2006.
Therearenostatisticallyoreconomicallysigniﬁcantdifferences betweenthecharacteristics
of students in schools constructed in the ﬁrst half of the project and the second.9 In short,
the timing of school construction does not appear to have been endogenous to student and
community characteristics.
A related question is whether school construction projects coincided with other school- or
community-level interventions. If a separate community center were built next to every
newly constructed school, it would not be possible to separate the effects of one from the
effects of the other using our methodology. It is difﬁcult to conclusively verify the absence
of additional interventions, but district ofﬁcials were not aware of any such policies.
Table 2: Characteristics of Treated and Untreated Schools in 2006
Untreated Treated p-value
Count (total) 21 18
Male 0.51 0.50 0.622
Black 0.53 0.54 0.886
Hispanic 0.32 0.32 0.949
English Language Learners (ELL) 0.14 0.100 0.38
Special Education 0.08 0.08 0.506
Free Lunch 0.80 0.78 0.623
Note: Comparison of student body characteristics of treated and untreated schools at
the project midpoint in terms of occupied buildings (2006). The p-value is from the
t-test of equality across the two groups. The joint test fails to reject the null hypothesis
of no relationship between the two groups at conventional levels.
9Informative cross-group comparisons of test scores are not feasible because we do not have test score
data prior to 2004, and many schools in the treated category had already been treated by then. Comparisons
of 2004 or 2006 scores would reﬂect the effects of treatment whether or not initial assignment was balanced.
9Figure 1: School completion by date and location.
Built between 1995 and 1999
Built between 2000 and 2004
Built between 2005 and 2010








Bet you can’t see me
Note: Different shaped symbols indicate schools that were completed in different moments of time.
It is also important to ask why district ofﬁcials chose to pursue such an ambitious infras-
tructureproject. In particular, onemightimaginethatthedistrictembarked upontheproject
to compensate for particularly decrepit pre-SCP facilities. If this were the case, it would
compromise the generalizability of our results to districts with better baseline levels of
infrastructure. As we have discussed above, this is not the case: school buildings in the
district were not in observably worse condition than school buildings in similar cities. That
said, we caution against applying our ﬁndings to schools in wealthier districts with average
or above-average levels of existing infrastructure.
103 Economic Framework
3.1 A conceptual model
To provide context for our empirical work, we present a simple theoretical framework of
neighborhood choice and school performance in a dynamic setting. We use the framework
to explore the relationship between home prices, neighborhood choice, and school per-
formance in a way that clariﬁes the assumptions necessary for unbiased estimation of the
causal effects of school construction on home prices and test scores using variation in the
timing of construction projects.
Let a measure of families reside in the district. Families are differentiated in terms of
preferences for local amenities θi and resources ωi. School quality is one important local
amenity. Each period, an exogenously selected proportion γ of individuals leave the dis-
trict, and a demographically equivalentproportion enter, so that the distributionof θi and ωi
within the district remains constant over time. This assumption simpliﬁes discussion and
will not affect our conclusions so long as school construction does not have a large effect
on cross-district migration.
All district residents must choose a home h ∈ H in which to live. Each home is located
within a school zone z ∈ Z, and the supply of homes within each zone is ﬁxed. District
residents who lived in the district in the previous period may choose either to remain in
their current home, or to pay a ﬁxed cost C to relocate within the district. If they choose to

















Here, κz is the quality of the school for zone z, χz are the local amenities, Xh are the
characteristics of home h, and ph
zt is the price of purchasing home h in zone z at time t.
0 < β < 1 is a discount factor. The expectation is taken over an information set given by
Ωit which can include beliefs regarding the timing of speciﬁc school construction projects.
New district arrivals face the same problem but do not pay the ﬁxed relocation cost.
This model captures in a general way the dynamicconsiderations that underly the interrela-
11tionshipsbetween migration, school enrollment, and school quality. Models of this typeare
not analytically tractable, and present substantialcomputational challenges as well (Meghir
and Rivkin (2010), Kennan and Walker (2011)). These challenges are beyond the scope of
this paper. Instead, we employ the model as a conceptual guide for predicting the effects
of school construction, and assessing the biases that may arise in reduced-form estimates
of these effects.
We focus in particular on three intuitive implications of this model:
i. School construction projects that raise neighborhood amenities χz or school quality
κz will tend to raise home prices in that neighborhood. Excess demand for that
location, given the original prices, will come from existing families who want to
readjust and also newly arrived families who will choose that location with a higher
probability.
ii. If families with school age children value school quality more than families without
children, raising κz will tend to raise the share of families with children in neigh-
borhood z. Further, if families with some values of θi and ωi value school quality
or amenities more than others, school construction will change the distribution of
preferences and resources across neighborhoods.
iii. In the short run, the size of price and demographic responses to school construction
will rise with the size of associated changes in school and amenity quality, decline
with ﬁxed cost C, and rise with migration rate γ. The larger the positive impact
of school construction and the easier it is for residents to respond, the larger price
changes and demographic consequences will be.
The ﬁrst two points indicate that we can interpret increases in neighborhood-speciﬁc prop-
erty values and populations of families with children as evidence that school construction
had an impact on school effects and/or amenities. The second and third points indicate
that selection of students into schools and neighborhoods will be an important challenge to
deal with in the estimation procedure, and provide some insight into when selection prob-
lems will be more or less severe. The next section describes our procedure for estimating
reduced-form effects of school construction on home prices, residential choice, and test
scores.
123.1.1 Empirical Model for Home Prices
Home prices are a function of neighborhood amenities χz, school quality κz, and speciﬁc
home characteristics Xh. This function may vary over time as the characteristics of neigh-
borhoods and neighborhood residents change. It also depends on the school construction
timeline: families will price in school construction as information about the project enters
their information set Ωit.





t β + αt + αz + γz · t + gt,{ℓ}(Sz) + ǫz(t)
h (2)
We approximate the variation in prices that is unrelated to school construction using a
set of time-varying property-level components (Xh
t β), neighborhood effects (αz), district-
widetimeeffects (αt), and neighborhoodleveltimetrends(γzt). Schoolconstructionenters
the price equation through a function gt,{ℓ}(Sz) that maps per-capita investment in school
construction Sz to prices, and ǫz(t)h is an i.i.d noise component.
We choose the form of gt,{ℓ} to balance our preference for simplicity with the need to
reﬂect the fact that school construction projects will be priced in gradually. Let {ℓ} =
{ℓfz,ℓcz,ℓoz}, where ℓfz is the date the project in neighborhood z was announced (the
‘ﬁling date’), ℓcz is the date construction began in neighborhood z, and ℓoz is the occupancy
date for the project in neighborhood z. Then
gt,{ℓ}(Sz) = Sz × (δf1[t ≥ ℓfz] + δc1[t ≥ ℓcz] + δo1[t ≥ ℓoz]). (3)
Home prices jump discontinuously as the project enters each new phase. The idea is that
home prices reﬂect the expected future value of the school to the neighborhood, and there-
fore change as uncertainty regarding the project is resolved. Effects are scaled by the per
capita dollar valueof the project, computed by dividingtotal cost by total occupancy.
SubstitutingequationEquation 3intoequationEquation 2leadstoadifference-in-differences
style speciﬁcation with three phases of treatment. That is, we estimate the effect of school
construction on home prices by comparing changes in home prices in neighborhoods in
which projects were announced, constructed, or occupied to simultaneous changes in home
13prices in neighborhoodswherethoseeventsdid notoccur oroccurred at different times. For
this model to yield unbiased estimates of construction effects, a) treatment dummies must
not be correlated with changes in the unobservable price determinants of transacted homes,
andb)treatmentscannotcoincidewithotherdiscontinuitiesinneighborhood-speciﬁctrends.
Assumption a) will be violated if families with the resources and tastes to select into neigh-
borhoods with new schools prefer homes that are unobservably more expensive than other
families. Fortunately, we can use assessor estimates of ‘unobserved’ home quality to ad-
dress this issue directly. We discuss this in more detail in the section 5. As mentioned
above, discussions with district ofﬁcials do not indicate that assumption b) is a major con-
cern.
3.2 Academic Achievement
Let the academic outcomes of child i at the school for zone z in grade g be given by
T
g
iz = κz + η
g
i + Xiβ + ǫ
g
iz (4)
where κz is the school’s value added to the student’s test score, Xi are observed student
demographics, and ǫ
g
iz is an i.i.d. shock. The η
g
i are unobserved factors that determine test
scores, such as parental investments or student effort. In general, the η
g
i will be correlated
with family resources ωi and preferences θi; we posit a speciﬁc relationship below.
The school valueadded κz can be interpreted as a function ofa variety of inputs, such as the
quality of teachers and administrators, the school culture, and school infrastructure. Given
that families choose their neighborhood through Equation 1, the assignment of students to
schools is not orthogonal to unobservable student characteristics η
g
i . This means that it is
not possible to directly estimate Equation 4 and recover κz, even when conditioning on Xi.
This is a classic problem of selection.
As with housing prices, we allow school construction projects to shift school quality κz
through a step function which varies with time relative to occupancy of the new school
building. We restrict the effects of school construction to be homogeneous across individ-
uals at each time relative to treatment. That is,
κz = κz(ℓ) = κz + δ
s
ℓSz (5)
14where ℓ denotes time relative to occupancy (in this case measured in academic years), and
δs
ℓ is the effect on school value added at time relative to treatment ℓ for each dollar or per-
capita neighborhood-speciﬁc expenditure Sz. We interpret δs
ℓ as the cumulative effect of
current and lagged school construction treatments; i.e., we do not attempt to distinguish
between the effects of having a new school this year on this year’s score from the effects of
having a new school last year on this year’s score.
We also allow the construction project to affect the unobserved student and family contri-
bution to test scores by changing the effort parents and students put into schoolwork. This
is expressed through the unobserved component of student test scores η
g
i. We model η
g
i
as a function of all current and prior investments that are not contingent on construction,
η(θi,ωi), plus a component that changes with the time relative to occupancy of the new
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ℓ are restricted to be the the same for all students and are interpreted as
the cumulative impact of construction to date.
Substituting Equation 5 and Equation 6 into Equation 4 we obtain the following expression
for student test scores:




fD(ℓ)Sz + Xiβ + ǫiz (7)
=κz + η
g
i(θi,ωi) + ∆D(ℓ)Sz + Xiβ + ǫiz (8)
D(ℓ) is a row vector of indicator variables which signal time relative to occupancy of




ℓmax]′, δs is deﬁned
analogously, and ∆ = δs + δf is a vector of the added family, student and school effects
of the school construction project. Separately identifying δf and δs would require data on
student and school investment that cannot be obtained in practice. Our goal is therefore to
estimate ∆, the total effect of school construction on academic achievement.
153.2.1 Post-randomization readjustment and effect identiﬁcation
Bias in OLS estimates of ∆ in Equation 7 stems from correlation between D(ℓ) and κz
or η
g
i. We will control directly for neighborhood effects in each of our empirical spec-
iﬁcations, and in some speciﬁcations control for neighborhood trends as well. Coupled
with the fact that school construction was not systematically associated with other school
policy changes, this mitigates our concern about bias arising through correlation with κz.
Further, because the initial assignment of school construction projects is unrelated to stu-
dent characteristics, D(ℓ) is orthogonal to all student-speciﬁc investments and locational
choices undertaken prior to knowledge of school construction. It follows that if families
do not make location choices in response to school construction, OLS estimates of school
construction effects will return unbiased estimates of ∆. The extent to which OLS esti-
mates are in fact biased depends on both the level of readjustment (which in turn depends
on within-district relocation costs C and district arrival rate γ) and on the relationship be-
tween neighborhood choice determinants (θi,ωi) and test score determinants η
g
i(θi,ωi). If
families readjust, but do so in a way that is independent of test score inputs, OLS estimates
will not be biased.
We consider three reduced-form estimators of ∆, each of which is unbiased under different
assumptions about the readjustment process and the error structure. The estimators and the
assumptions required to yield unbiasedness are as follows:
i. OLS Estimator:
Tigz = τzg + τt + ∆D(ℓ)Sz + Xiβ + eiz (9)
τzg and τt are grade-school and academic year ﬁxed effects, respectively. We must
assume D(ℓ) is orthogonal to η
g
i for all ℓ. This assumption holds if school construc-
tion projects are assigned randomly and families either do not readjust their school
choices or readjust in a way that is uncorrelated with score determinants η
g
i.
ii. Student Fixed Effect Estimator:
Tigz = τzg + τt + τi + ∆D(ℓ)Sz + eiz (10)
16τi are individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects. Here, D(ℓ) may be correlated with η
g
i for
any ℓ, but we restrict η
g
i = ηi for all g. In this case the ﬁxed effects estimator
will recover estimates of ∆, as the individual level heterogeneity in unobservable
characteristics ηi will be captured in τi. This assumption will hold if ρgs = 0 for all
s greater than the lowest g for which we have valid test score observations. Even if
these assumptions fail, value added estimation will improve on OLS estimation to
the extent that conditioning on past scores weakens the relationship between school
construction treatment and unobservable score determinants.
iii. Value Added Estimator:
Tigz = τzg + τt + πTi,g−1,z + ∆D(ℓ)Sz + Xiβ + eiz (11)
This estimator is identical to OLS but controls for lagged test scores. Even if D(ℓ)
is correlated with η
g
i, value added estimation yields unbiased estimates the effects of
current-year school construction under two assumptions.The ﬁrst assumption is that
the effects of all test score inputs–including lagged school construction treatments–
decay geometrically year to year. The second is that contemporaneous investments
are orthogonal to D(ℓ). The geometric decay assumption in particular is strict and
likely to be invalid (Todd and Wolpin (2007), Rothstein (2010)). Even so, value
addedestimationoffersadvantagesoverOLSestimationinthatitcontrolsdirectlyfor
individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity in scores. Value added estimation also addresses a
weakness of FE estimation by allowing for (heavily parameterized) individualeffects
that vary over time.
Noneoftheseestimatorsisperfect. OLSestimateswilllikelybebiasediflocationalchoices
respond to school construction plans once they are revealed. Fixed effect and value added
estimators allow for a ﬂexible readjustment process, but require strong assumptions on
the form of η
g
i. Below, we present evidence that families do change locational choices
in response to construction. We therefore focus our analysis on the ﬁxed effect and value-
added estimators rather than the OLS speciﬁcation. If these estimators yield similarresults,
and the timing of observed effects closely follows the timing of the school construction, we
will interpret our ﬁndings as strong evidence of an effect of school construction on student
scores.
174 Data
4.1 Home sales data
Our home sales data is a complete record of all residential property sales that took place
in the school district between January 1st, 1995 and January 31st, 2010. We obtained
this data from administrative records maintained by the Ofﬁce of the City Clerk. The
data include sale prices as well as a variety of property and home characteristics. These
characteristics include property address and acreage, home square footage, the number of
bedrooms, bathrooms, and total rooms, and the ‘style’ of the property (e.g., ‘Georgian,’ or
‘multi-family’). The data also include a subjective evaluation of each home made by the
town tax assessor. These evaluations are categorical and range from ‘poor’ to ‘excellent.’
The assessor’s evaluations have substantial explanatory power even after conditioning on
observable home characteristics, and therefore can be interpreted as a measure of what
would in most cases be deemed ‘unobservable’ home quality.
We match homes to their zoned schools using the district’s school assignment guidelines.
We focus our analysis on construction of elementary and middle schools because Dis-
trict high schools are generally not bound by neighborhood zones and enroll students from
across the district.
Table 3 summarizes thehomesales data. Between thebeginningof1995 and January 2010,
there were 14,266 residential properties sold in the district. The pace of sales was relatively
slow between 1995 and 1999, during which time 2,817 homes were sold, and picked up
thereafter to a rate of over 5,000 homes per ﬁve year period. We were able to match nearly
all of thesales records to elementary-middle-highschool triplets. Non-matches were dueto
incomplete address records in the sales data or omissions from the school assignment list.
The average price of a home sold in the district rose from $120,301 between 1995 and 1999
to $164,345 between 2000 and 2004 to $245,909 between 2005 and 2010. This occurred
even though characteristics of the transacted homes did not change very much: square
footage, acreage, and number of rooms all remained relatively constant between 1995 and
2010. About 40 percent of homes sold in each period were deemed by the assessor to be
high quality, a constructed binary designation that includes good to excellent ratings.
18Table 3: Fifteen Years of District Home Sales
1995-2010 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2010
Number of Homes Sold 14266 2817 5784 5665
Matched to schools 14081 2772 5718 5591
Price (mean) 188,000 120,000 164,000 246,000
Price (median) 156,000 101,000 140,000 213,000
Square feet 1956 2026 1948 1929
Acreage 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11
Bedrooms 3.64 3.60 3.62 3.67
Bathrooms 1.88 1.87 1.89 1.89
Rooms 7.98 7.92 7.98 8.01
High quality 0.39 0.45 0.38 0.37
Note: Data describe the populationof homesales in New Haven over the 1995-2010period. Sales
are counted as matched to schools if we can locate the address on the map of school zones and
assign it elementary, middle, and high schools. Prices are in 2005 dollars and rounded to nearest
1000. High quality is equal to one if the it is described as ‘good,’ ‘above average,’ or ‘excellent’
in assessor’s records.
4.2 Student residency data
To examine the impact of the SCP on residential choices, we use data on the addresses
of enrolled students for the academic years 2002-2003 through 2009-2010.10 As with
the home sales data, we map student addresses to neighborhoods by zoned elementary-,
middle-, and high-school triplets. The idea is that public school enrollment levels reﬂect
the outcomes of the location choice process for families with children.
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of neighborhood-year observations of
school enrollment levels and ﬂows. Over the period in question, average enrollment in a
district neighborhood was 740, and trended downward from an average of 794 students
per neighborhood in 2004 to an average 693 students per neighborhood in 2010. The
lower rows of Table 4 decompose this change into cross-district and within-district inﬂows
and outﬂows. Inﬂows count the number of enrolled students living in a neighborhood
in a given year who were not enrolled in the district in the previous year, or who were
enrolled but lived in a different neighborhood. Outﬂows count the number of students who
10We refer to academic years using the spring year from this point forward.
19lived in a given neighborhood and were enrolled in a district school last year, but this year
either were not enrolled or remained enrolled but moved to a different neighborhood. On
average, 215 students are new to a neighborhood each year, while 233 students leave. This
is consistent with the observed pattern of decreasing enrollment over time. Note that both
inﬂow and outﬂow counts capture a wide variety of student movements. Inﬂows include
district residents entering publicschool for the ﬁrst time, studentsarriving from out of town
in time for ﬁfth grade, and students whose families move across town at any point during
a students’ time in the district. Outﬂows include students who drop out, graduate, switch
neighborhoods within the district, or leave the district entirely.
We further decompose inﬂows (outﬂows) by students’ starting point (destination). Specif-
ically, we deﬁne intra-district inﬂows and outﬂows as those in which a student switches
neighborhoods within the district but remains enrolled in school. Interdistrict inﬂows then
consist of students who are new to district enrollment, while interdistrict outﬂows consist
of students who leave the district. Intradistrict inﬂows and outﬂows must be equal in any
given year,11 so changes in total district enrollment are determined by interdistrict ﬂows.
On average, about 89 students– 12 percent of the average enrollment level– arrive and
leave neighborhoods each year through intradistrict ﬂows. We see in Table 4 that on av-
erage a neighborhood gains 126 enrollees through interdistrict inﬂows in a given year, but
loses 140 enrollees through interdistrict outﬂows. The overall picture painted by data on
neighborhood-level enrollment and ﬂows is one of a school district that is shrinking in size
and in substantial residential ﬂux, as students enter and leave the district and move within
it.
11Differences in standard deviations are expected and reﬂect the fact that intra-neighborhood inﬂows and
outﬂows can have different distributions even if they have the same mean.
20Table 4: Mean and Standard Deviation of School enrollment by neighborhood
Total 2004 2007 2010
Enrollment 740 794 712 693
386 413 374 379
Inﬂows 215 233 209 200
113 118 113 107
Inﬂows: inter. 126 138 114 122
66 69 60 68
Inﬂows: intra. 89 95 96 78
52 54 58 44
Outﬂows 229 230 262 199
121 128 130 99
Outﬂows: inter. 140 135 166 122
75 72 84 63
Outﬂows: intra. 89 95 96 78
53 62 55 41
N 200 25 25 25
Note: Student enrollment in district public schools by neighborhood-year. Within each row, the
upper number is the variable mean and the lower number is the standard deviation. Inﬂows rep-
resent students new to a neighborhood between current year and previous year. See text for a
description of the distinction between inter- and intra-district in- and out-ﬂows.
4.3 Test score data
To assess the effect of the SCP on academic outcomes, we use student microdata for the
academic years 2004 through 2010. Key variables include student race, English Language
Learner (ELL) status, special education status, free or reduced-price lunch status, and stu-
dent scores on state-mandated assessment tests (the Connecticut Mastery Test, or CMT),
which we standardize using state-level means and standard deviations within grade-year
cells. Table 5 shows summary statistics for the students in our data. We have data on
152,151 student-years overthe seven-year window, reﬂecting a district size of about 22,000
students. Black students make up roughly half of all students, and Hispanic students ac-
count for another 35 percent. Because the proportion of free lunch students is so high, all
district students receive free lunch at school. Each year, the district sends home a survey
requesting income data so that they can renew district-level free lunch eligibility, and our
data reﬂects the results of this survey. Generally about 80 percent of students report being
21free or reduced price eligible.12 Mean reading and math scores in the district were approx-
imately two thirds of a student-level standard deviation below state means throughout the
period.
Table 5: School district demographic proﬁle
Total Matched In-district matched FE sample VA sample
N 152151 136883 123275 38191 20584
Black 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.51
Hisp. 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.39
ELL 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11
Spec. Ed. 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.06
F/R lunch 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.85 0.92
Reading -0.66 -0.65 -0.69 -0.65 -0.63
Math -0.63 -0.62 -0.66 -0.59 -0.57
PK-2 0.31 0.26 0.27 0 0
Gr. 3-8 0.41 0.45 0.46 1 1
Gr. 9-12 0.27 0.29 0.27 0 0
Note: Characteristics of student population observed in microdata. Unit of observation is the student-year.
‘Total’ column includes all students in district. ‘Matched’ column includes student-years with matched ad-
dresses. ‘In-districtmatched’ includes student years with matched addresses for in-district students only (i.e.,
not students from neighboring towns). ‘FE sample’ column describes student-year obs. with current-year
scores for students who are never enrolled in transitional schools, and have test scores less than three stan-
darddeviationsaboveorbelow district mean. ‘VA sample’columnintroduceslag-scorerequirement.Reading
scores and math scores standardized using state-level means and standard deviations.
When conducting our analysis of test scores, we restrict our student sample in a number
of ways. Since treatments take place at the neighborhood level, we eliminate enrollment
records that cannot be matched to addresses. As shown in the second column of Table 5,
matched students tend to be older than the student body as a whole but are otherwise de-
mographically indistinguishable. We also eliminate out-of-district students who enroll in
district schools, because these students cannot be matched to neighborhood-level treat-
12In 2005, the district school lunch survey estimated that only 35 percent of students were eligible, a sharp
break with both earlier and later datapoints. District ofﬁcials attribute this to poor survey design in that year,
combined with the limited incentives parents have to ﬁll out the forms. We experimented with dropping the
free lunch dummy from our analysis. This generally increased both the magnitude and sign of our results, so
to be conservative we chose to include the variable despite its inconsistency across time.
22ments.13 The third column of Table 5 describes these students, who again resemble the
broader student population.
To construct our analysis sample from the sample of in-district students with matched ad-
dresses, we make several further sample trims. We eliminate students who attend ‘transi-
tional’ schools– schools speciﬁcally for struggling students– in any of our data years. We
eliminate these students because transitional schools are not tied to speciﬁc school zones,
and because we are interested in the effects of school construction on students in stan-
dard academic programs.14 We also drop student-year observations with test scores more
than three standard deviations above or below the mean. The goal of this cut is to limit
the impact of score outliers on our analysis, but in practice our results are not sensitive to
changing or eliminating the threshold.
In our main analysis sample, used for ﬁxed effect estimation, we include all remaining
student-year observations with valid scores. This requirement eliminates students in non-
tested grades: the CMT was administered in grades three through eight between 2006 and
2010, and in grades four, six, and eight prior to 2006. Students in other grades are dropped.
This sample is described in the fourth column of Table 5. In our value added analysis,
we include only students with nonmissing current- and prior-year scores. This sample is
described in the ﬁfth column of Table 5. The prior-year score requirement eliminates all
students in academic years 2004 and 2005, third and fourth graders in 2006, and third
graders between 2007 through 2010. Though requiring the presence of baseline scores
reduces our sample size from 38,191 to 20,584, students in the value added sample do not
differ substantially from students in the ﬁxed effects sample in terms of their observable
characteristics.
5 Effects on home prices
Table 6 reports our estimates of three versions of equation 2. We report results for elemen-
tary school and middle school construction only, since high school assignment is generally
not neighborhood based. The ﬁrst column includes year effects, seasonal effects, observ-
able home covariates, neighborhood intercepts and slopes, and high school construction
treatment variables as controls. We ﬁnd that sale prices rise by 0.29 percent per $10,000
13These students enroll in District schools through regional school choice programs.
14Including these students does not affect our ﬁndings.
23of per-capita construction expenditure upon ﬁling, 0.13 percent upon the beginning of con-
struction, and a further 0.85 percent upon occupancy. The prices changes at ﬁling and
construction start are not signiﬁcantly different from zero, but we reject the hypothesis
that the change at occupancy is zero at the ﬁve percent level. The estimated total effect of
construction– the sum of the score gains at each project phase– is 1.27 percent per $10,000
in per capita expenditure, and is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the ﬁve percent level.
Multiplying the total effect by the average level of per capita expenditure across all houses
in the regression sample (roughly 8.1) shows that the average effect of elementary and
middle school construction was to raise home prices by a total of 10.2 percent.
In columnII, weaddcontrolsforassessor-measured‘unobservables’totheregression. This
causes our estimated effects to rise slightly: prices increase by 0.95 percent per $10,000
in per-capita expenditure upon occupancy, and by 1.38 percent in total. The estimated av-
erage effect of construction on home prices rises to 11.1 percent. In column III, we add
a interaction term between dollars of per-student expenditure, a post-occupancy dummy,
and years post occupancy. This allows the post-occupancy effect to deteriorate or increase
over time. The estimated effect, labeled δs
o, is small and statistically insigniﬁcant. It ap-
pears that school construction has a signiﬁcant and large effect on home prices, and that
our results are not driven by neighborhood-speciﬁc trends or by changes in the unobserv-
able characteristics of homes sold, and that post-occupancy effects do not decay as time
passes.
To put the size of these effects into perspective, it is useful to construct a back-of-the-
envelope estimate of the total effect of elementary and middle school construction on tax
revenues and compare it to the total cost of the project. Assume for the purposes of this
exercise that the average effect of school construction on the value of all district real estate
(residential and non-residential) is the same as its average effect on the price of transacted
homes. Assumefurther that there are no spillovereffects, so that school construction in one
neighborhood does not affect the prices of homes in other neighborhoods. Then the change
in annual tax revenues resulting from construction of elementary and middle schools can
be written
δtax = Real estate value × Tax rate × Average effect
24Table 6: Elementary and middle school construction and home prices
I II III
δf 0.0029 0.0033 0.00322
(0.0027) (0.0027) ( 0.0024)
δc 0.0013 0.0011 0.0010
(0.0021) (0.0021) ( 0.0025 )





δpre 0.0042 0.0044 0.0042
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
δtot 0.0127** 0.0138** 0.0137**
(0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0059)
Average Effect 0.102 0.111 0.110
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Season effects Yes Yes Yes
House Covariates Yes Yes Yes
High School const. Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood Slope Yes Yes Yes
Quality No Yes Yes
Neighborhood Clustering Yes Yes Yes
N 13559 13551 13551
*: Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. **: Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. ***: Signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. Results from a regression of log home sale price in 2005 dollars on time relative to ﬁl-
ing, occupancy, construction of neighborhood elementary and middle schools (per $10,000
in per-capita expenditure), and the indicated covariates. δf, δc, and δo refer to effects ob-
served upon project announcement, construction start, and occupancy, respectively. δs
o is a
slope parameter that allows δo to change with years post-occupancy. δpre = δf + δc, and
δtot = δf + δc + δo. Average effects are equal to δtot multiplied by average per-capita ex-
penditure weighted by home sales. HS construction treatment variables are included but not
reported. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhoodlevel.
The most recent assessed value of the stock of real estate in New Haven is $5.2 billion
(in 2005 dollars), and the property tax rate is 0.0439. Combining these values with the
25estimatedaverageeffect fromcolumnII(11.1percent)indicatesthatδtax isequaltoroughly
$25 million. If, as reported in column III, effect sizes do not diminish signiﬁcantly over
time, and if city government can borrow and lend at a ﬁve percent rate of interest, then the
costs of delaying investmentin school construction are quite high: a ten year postponement
of the stream of $25 million payments has a present value cost of $218 million. This
represents more than a ﬁfth of the $1.07 billion of total expenditures on elementary and
middle school construction. The key point here is not that this value represents a precise
estimate of the cost of postponing investment, but rather that the value District residents
place on school construction investment is large enough that the District can expect to
mechanically recoup at least some portion of its costs through increased tax revenue.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that these results do not rule out forward-looking be-
havior on the part of home-buyers. Roughly a third of the total effect of school construction
accrues prior to buildingoccupancy, though these pre-effects are not statisticallysigniﬁcant
by themselves. And even if pre-occupancy price effects are in fact zero, this is consistent
with a model in which home-buyers are forward-looking but skeptical about the prospects
for project completion.
6 Effects on school enrollment
At least two distinct stories are consistent with our ﬁnding that school construction in-
creases home prices. The ﬁrst is that school infrastructure is a selling point for home-
owners regardless of whether they have children they intend to enroll in a neighborhood
school. For example, homeowners may value local amenities like swimming pools or play-
ing ﬁelds. The second is that price increases are driven by the desire of homeowners to
enroll their children in the rebuilt schools. These stories are not mutually exclusive, but
have different implications for the effects of infrastructure investment on schooling de-
mand and community demographics. In this section, we examine the relationship between
schooling demand and the residency patterns for district students, and ﬁnd support for the
second story, though we cannot rule out the ﬁrst using the data at hand.
Figure 2 and the ﬁrst column of Table B -3 display estimated enrollment elasticities com-
puted using a regression of log public school enrollment by neighborhood on per capita
infrastructure investment, year ﬁxed effects, and neighborhood ﬁxed effects. The coefﬁ-
cients on treatment dummies for years more than ﬁve years prior to building occupancy are
26restricted to be zero, and coefﬁcients on treatment dummies corresponding to six or more
years after treatment are restricted to be the same. In the four years prior to occupancy,
the effects of school construction on neighborhood enrollment differ signiﬁcantly from en-
rollment levels six or more years pre-occupancy, but effect sizes are small. Beginning in
the year of occupancy, the enrollment effects begin to rise, and continue to do so for the
next ﬁve years. The trend ﬂattens out six or more years post-occupancy. By this point,
$10,000 of per capita school construction expenditure raises neighborhood enrollment by
4.4 percent. Note that because these ﬁndings reﬂect changes in where students live, they
cannot be a mechanical result of changes in school capacity.
Figure 2: The effects of school construction on neighborhood residency
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Note: The ﬁgure shows the effect of $10,000 per capita school construction treatment on log neighborhood
enrollment by year relative to occupancy. The estimates are obtained from Equation 2. See Table B -3.
Shaded area represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
To raise neighborhood enrollment, school construction must either increase neighborhood
inﬂows or reduce neighborhood outﬂows. Table B -3 reports estimated effects obtained
using an identical speciﬁcation with the logs of these two quantities as the dependent vari-
ables. Effects on inﬂows follow a similar pattern to those on overall enrollment: no dis-
27cernible trend pre-occupancy, and then a steady post-occupancy increase. By the sixth
year post occupancy, $10,000 of per capita expenditure raises neighborhood inﬂows by 6.7
percent. This estimate differs signiﬁcantly from zero at the ﬁve percent level. For out-
ﬂows, the effect of school construction is delayed. Effects are approximately zero until
three years after occupancy, when they begin to rise. Six or more years post occupancy,
$10,000 of per capita expenditure raises outﬂows by 5.0 percent. As reported in columns
four through seven of Table B -3, inﬂows and outﬂows reﬂect a balance of inter- and intra-
district movers. Changes in enrollment are thus the result of post-occupancy increases in
student ‘churn’; inﬂow effects are larger and begin earlier than outﬂow effects.
Who are the new arrivals to neighborhoods with rebuilt schools? To answer this question
we construct indices of observable test score determinants by regressing reading and math
scores on race dummies, a sex dummy, and free lunch status and computing predicted test
score values for each student. We do not include ELL and special education status in the
indices because these outcomes may be endogenous to education quality. Table 7 reports
results from a regression of math and reading score indices on a post-occupancy dummy
multiplied by per-student building expenditures (in $10,000 per-student units), controlling
for year and neighborhood/grade ﬁxed effects. The coefﬁcient on the expenditure-scaled
post-occupancy dummy is labeled δpost, and differs signiﬁcantly from zero in both the math
and reading speciﬁcations. In the Supplemental Appendix we show that these increases
are due to growth in index values beginning at least one year post-occupancy. Covariate-
speciﬁc regressions (available upon request) show that these effects are driven largely by
changes in thefree lunch statusofneighborhoodstudents. School constructionbringsmany
new students into neighborhoods, and the choice to move is correlated with demographics
that predict high test scores.





Year FE Yes Yes
School/grade FE Yes Yes
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level. *: Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Results from a regression of a
linear index of test score observables on year FEs, neighborhood/grade FEs, and dollars of
per-student investment interacted with a post-occupancy dummy. The linear index includes
race dummies, sex dummies, and free lunch status. Weights are determined by a regression
of test scores on these variables. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood-yearlevel.
The ﬁnding that neighborhood-speciﬁc school enrollment begins to rise at the time of
school occupancy is consistentwith the ﬁnding of rising homeprices at that juncture. In the
context of our conceptual model, it suggests that migration rates are high enough or ﬁxed
costs low enough that readjustment in response to school construction is feasible; families
willing to pay for school infrastructure move in, while families not willing to pay move
out. Demographically advantaged families with school-age children with appear to value
the change in neighborhood amenities associated with school construction more than other
types of households. One possible reason for this is that families with children beneﬁt
directly from any test score gains associated with construction, and families from high-
scoring demographic groups either place an especially high value on these gains or can
more easily pay the costs associated with moving. The next section assesses the size of the
test score gains caused by school construction.
7 Effects on test scores
Table 8 presents results from estimates of equations 9 (OLS), 10 (ﬁxed effects), and 11
(value added) for reading and math scores. For each subject area, the ﬁrst column presents
the OLS speciﬁcation, the second the value added speciﬁcation, and the third column the
ﬁxedeffect speciﬁcation. Werestricteffectsto bezero morethanﬁveyears priortobuilding
occupancy, and to be equal six or more years post-occupancy. OLS estimates of reading
score effects are generally insigniﬁcant but trend upwards; point estimates are less than
0.0043 for all years pre-occupancy, but are equal to at least 0.0095 four or more years post-
occupancy. The theoretically preferable value added and ﬁxed effects measures show dis-
29tinct trend breaks beginningin the year of buildingoccupancy. Value added and ﬁxed effect
estimates rise in parallel for at least the ﬁrst six years after building occupancy.15 By six or
more years post-occupancy, $10,000 of per-student infrastructure investment raises reading
scores by 0.0265 standard deviations in the ﬁxed effect speciﬁcation and 0.0236 standard
deviations in the value added speciﬁcation. In both the ﬁxed effect and value added spec-
iﬁcations, coefﬁcients become signiﬁcant at the ten percent level in the year of occupancy
and are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level four or more years post-occupancy.16
We interpret the trend break in estimated effects at the time of building occupancy as strong
evidence that school construction caused reading scores to rise in affected neighborhoods.
That we observe this pattern even when controlling for individual-speciﬁc heterogeneity in
multiple ways indicates that the estimated effects are appropriately viewed as the causal
impact of school construction on the individual education production function (whether
through motivational or direct pedagogical channels), not as a consequence of selection
into treated neighborhoods. Arguing against this interpretation requires a story in which
selection into treated neighborhoods is correlated with time-varying individual-speciﬁc ef-
fects conditional on prior year scores.
Estimates of math score effects do not paint as clear a picture. There is some evidence of a
positive effect on math scores in the year of occupancy, as both the value added and ﬁxed
effect estimates differ signiﬁcantly from zero at the ten percent level. In addition, estimates
from the value added speciﬁcation begin to slope upward three years after construction,
reaching a level of 0.0172 six or more years post-occupancy. This effect is relatively close
to the estimate in the reading speciﬁcation, but does not differ signiﬁcantly from zero at the
ten percent level. OLS and ﬁxed effect estimates show no discernible trend. Our estimates
are noisy, so we cannot reject large effect sizes. However, compared to the strong evidence
we ﬁnd for reading score effects, evidence of math score effects is very weak.
15Note, however, that value added and ﬁxed effect estimates are not strictly comparable. The value added
estimates imply dynamic effects of lagged treatments on current scores, while ﬁxed effect estimates do not.
16Out of the thirty pre-occupancy effects we estimate (ﬁve coefﬁcients in each of six speciﬁcations), four
are signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. This is consistent with what we would expect given a true effect of
zero in these years.Figure 3: Effect of school construction on score levels
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Fixed Effect Estimates of ∆ - Reading























Note: Estimates of effects of per-capita school construction spending on student score levels by year relative
to treatment, as described in equation 5. Shaded areas show a 90 percent conﬁdence interval, allowing for
clustered errors at the neighborhood-year level. Squares indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% level. Controls
include student characteristics, year effects, and school-grade ﬁxed effects. Estimates reported in Tables 8.
31Table 8: Effect of school construction on test scores
Reading Math
t − t0 OLS VA FE OLS VA FE
-5 0.002 -0.0009 0.002 0.0026 0.0007 0.0038**
0.0016 0.0032 0.0018 0.0019 0.0031 0.0019
-4 0.0038** 0.0014 0.0023 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0015
0.0017 0.0032 0.0023 0.002 0.0036 0.0022
-3 0.0031 0.0034 0.0051* 0.0017 0.0021 0.0037
0.002 0.0034 0.0028 0.0024 0.004 0.0026
-2 0.0013 0.0004 0.0036 0.0004 0.0003 0.0029
0.0019 0.0037 0.0032 0.0025 0.0042 0.0029
-1 0.0043* 0.0019 0.0054 0.0031 0.0012 0.0033
0.0024 0.0038 0.0037 0.0027 0.0043 0.0034
0 0.0062* 0.0100* 0.0094** 0.0056 0.0103* 0.0068*
0.0033 0.0055 0.0047 0.0039 0.0055 0.0041
1 0.0046 0.0102* 0.0106* -0.0007 0.0024 -0.0006
0.0037 0.0059 0.0056 0.0046 0.0065 0.0049
2 0.0064 0.0126* 0.0128* -0.0018 0.0055 -0.0032
0.0045 0.0065 0.0067 0.005 0.0072 0.0056
3 0.0044 0.0158* 0.0161** 0.0013 0.0114 -0.0001
0.0054 0.0083 0.0079 0.0064 0.0085 0.0064
4 0.0095 0.0204** 0.0200** 0.0038 0.0147 0.0021
0.006 0.009 0.0093 0.0072 0.0099 0.0078
5 0.0136** 0.0213** 0.0224** 0.0075 0.012 0.001
0.0065 0.0099 0.0109 0.0077 0.011 0.009
6+ 0.0123 0.0236** 0.0265** 0.0061 0.0172 0.0029
0.0076 0.0113 0.012 0.009 0.0128 0.0104
Student Cov. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Student FEs No No Yes No No Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nbd./Grade FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sch./Grade FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lag scores No Yes No No Yes No
N 38617 20584 38191 38694 21022 38991
*: signiﬁcant at the 10 percentlevel. **: signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percentlevel. Column ‘FE’ displays estimates
of effects of per-capita school construction expenditure by year relative to treatment obtained using equation
10 with reading/math z-scores as the dependent variable in the FE analysis sample. Column ‘VA’ displays
estimates of score gains obtained using equation 11 in the VA analysis sample. Controls include observable
student covariates, year FEs, neighborhood/grade/school FEs, and lag scores (as indicated). Standard errors
allow for clustering at the neighborhood-yearlevel.
32How large are the results presented here relative to the effects of other test score determi-
nants? The average student lived in a neighborhood that received $76,800 of per-capita
school construction expenditure.17 Multiplying this value by the estimated reading score
effect six or more years post-occupancy in the ﬁxed effect added speciﬁcation, we esti-
mate that on average school construction raised reading scores by 0.21 standard deviations.
These effects are large, but not implausibly so. Lottery-based evaluations of the effects of
attending high-performing KIPP charter schools ﬁnd score gains of 0.12 standard devia-
tions for reading and 0.35 standard deviations for math per year of enrollment (Angrist et
al. (2010)). Between 6thand 8thgrade, studentsenrolled inHarlem Children’s Zone(HCZ)
schools experience reading score gains of one quarter to one third of a standard deviation
and math score gains of 0.8 standard deviations relative to HCZ non-participants (Dobbie
and Roland G. Fryer (2009)).
It is also useful to relate these results to changes in home prices and school enrollment
by computing the implied elasticities of home prices and school enrollment with respect to
changes in test scores. Ifschool constructiononly altered homeprices throughits effects on
student test scores, we could reasonably compute the elasticity of home prices with respect
to school quality by dividing the percentage change in home prices post-construction by
the per-capita change in test scores post-construction. Of course, school construction may
affect home prices through other channels, like neighborhood aesthetics or access to public
facilities. We conduct the exercise in spite of this limitation and interpret our results as
upper bounds on the true elasticities. We further assume that long-term test score effects
are immediately capitalized into home prices.
From Table 6, we know that the estimated effect of $10,000 of per student expenditure
on home prices was 1.3 percent. From Table B -3, we know that the estimated effect on
neighborhood enrollment counts six or more years post-occupancy was 4.4 percent. The
estimated effect of school construction on reading scores six or more years post-occupancy
in the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation was 0.027 standard deviations. These values imply that
a 0.1 standard deviation increase in a school’s effect on reading scores would raise home
prices by 4.7 percent and public school enrollment amongst neighborhood children by 16.2
percent. These elasticities should not be compared directly to those presented in Black
(1999) or Bayer et al. (2007), because both the numerator and denominator differ in criti-
17This number is smaller than the home-sale weighted average expenditure of $81,000. Relative to home
sales, students were disproportionatelyconcentrated in low-investment neighborhoods.
33cal ways. In the denominator, we use student-level standard test score standard deviations
while Bayer et al. and Black use percent changes in school average scores. In the numera-
tor, we use changes in the causal effect of schools on test score production, while they use
school average scores which incorporate both school causal effects and student selection
into schools.
8 Possible Mechanisms
8.1 How do school construction projects help students?
Having documented the test score gains that accompany the construction of new school
buildings, it is natural to ask why this might occur. Thus far, we have remained agnostic
about whether school construction affects test scores through the direct pedagogical effect
of improved facilities or through improved motivation for students and teachers. In prac-
tice, it may be difﬁcult to distinguish between the two pathways. If a student’s access to
a computer within the classroom encourages him to read news online when at home and
this improves his reading score, it is unclear whether to attribute the gain to the speciﬁc
feature of the facilities or to the change in investment. Still, some pathways can be clearly
categorized, and if one or the other plays a dominant role it would be valuable to know
this.
A related question with important implications for policymakers is which building features
are associated with score gains. Even if the pedagogical impacts of a given feature could
not be distinguished form the motivational effects, future construction programs might like
to design buildings with features that have large total effects. Unfortunately, we do not
have consistent data on the characteristics of the newly-constructed buildings, and there-
fore cannot examine the heterogeneity of construction effects across building features in a
quantitative way.
In lieu of a quantitative analysis, we address the motivation versus pedagogy issue and
the speciﬁc building features question using a survey of district principals. We surveyed
principalsat22 districtschoolsabouttheirexperiencesbefore, during, and afterschoolcon-
struction. We chose to interview school principals rather than teachers or students because
we believe principals’ experiences are likely to be the most representative of school cli-
mate as a whole. Of the 22 principals we surveyed, ten were in ofﬁce at the time of school
34construction; we restrict our discussion to the responses of these ten individuals.
Our questionnaire asked principals to rate the contribution of the SCP to student, parent,
and teacher motivation, and the timing of any observed changes. We also asked about the
improvements they observed in different facility attributes, like libraries, classrooms, and
ventilation, and about how much they believed each improvement type contributed to aca-
demic performance. We then asked principals to weigh the relative importance of indirect
motivationaleffects and direct ‘new facilities’effects inimprovingstudents’scores. Copies
of the survey are available upon request.
Principals agreed that the school construction project raised motivation at home and at
school. All ofthe surveyedprincipals reported moderateto large effects ofschool construc-
tion on parent involvement, and nine of the ten reported large effects on student motivation.
All principals reported moderate or large effects on teacher motivation. When asked to
compare the importance of motivational effects to the importance of direct infrastructure
effects for raising test scores, nine out of ten principals believed that the motivational ef-
fects of the SCP were at least as important as the direct effects of improved infrastructure
on pedagogy. Though principals likely faced the same difﬁculties we do when trying to
separate motivational from pedagogical effects, the surveys indicate that, at minimum, ob-
served school construction effects are not entirely due to direct pedagogical changes. This
is consistent with the emphasis placed on community, student, and teacher involvement in
the construction process, and with a growing economic literature on the importance of in-
trinsicmotivationindeterminingstudentoutcomes(see, e.g., Heckmanet al.(2006)).
When asked to identify speciﬁc building features that were important to student success,
principals pointed to library improvements and heating, air conditioning and ventilation.
Particularly interesting in this part of the survey were the responses principals gave to
an open-ended question in which they were asked to identify important pathways through
which school construction affected student outcomes that had not been identiﬁed elsewhere
on the survey. Several responses focused on ‘student and teacher pride,’ while others iden-
tiﬁed important but subtle building features, such as a glass wall which allowed teachers to
observestudentactivitiesin hallwayswhilestanding in a central courtyard location. An im-
plication is that some of the infrastructure features that determine student achievement may
be a) relatively inexpensive, but b) difﬁcult to measure or categorize. This presents both an
opportunity and a challenge to designers of future infrastructure improvements.
359 Discussion
This paper describes the effects of a comprehensive school construction program in a poor
urban district on student and community outcomes. We ﬁnd that school construction had
substantial positive effects on home prices in affected neighborhoods, and led to increases
in the population of families with children attending public schools. These effects coin-
cided with increases in student reading scores on the order of those typically observed in
students who win lotteries to attend high-performing charter schools. Given the pressing
need for large-scale investment in school infrastructure at the national level, and in poor,
urban areas in particular, our ﬁndings are important for assessing the costs and beneﬁts of
potential infrastructure policies.
The evidence presented here also links prior work on the home price effects of school
construction to a broader literature on the way that housing markets capture school quality.
We document for the ﬁrst time the way that dynamic changes in school quality (and other
amenities associated with school construction) impact home prices and patterns of public
school enrollment, and in doing so help explain how the social stratiﬁcation along school
boundaries described in Bayer et al. (2007) could arise over time due to local changes
in education policy. We innovate further with respect to the housing market literature by
focusing on the price effects of changes in the causal effect of schools on student scores,
not on school average scores that mix differences in education production with student
selection. This distinction is important if we wish to separate the value families place on
school quality and the value they place on attending schools that students with high levels
of observable and unobservable test score determinants also attend.
Our work has number of important limitations. We cannot determine whether school con-
struction affects test scores through speciﬁc changes to the built environment that enhance
pedagogy, or through more generalized changes in student, parent, and teacher motivation
that accompany the project. A survey of school principals suggests that both physical and
motivational changes play an important role. A corollary is that we cannot identify spe-
ciﬁc building features that are particularly important for improved educational outcomes,
though more expensiveprojects are associated with larger effects. Our attempts to compute
the elasticities of home prices with respect to changes in school value added are hampered
by the fact that we cannot determine the extent to which home buyers value other ameni-
ties associated with school construction. We therefore interpret the estimated elasticities as
36upper bounds on the true effects of test scores on prices.
We conclude with a broader discussion of the relationship between school construction
and other policy interventions aimed at helping students in poor urban districts. The basic
challenge in these districtsis to help studentsfrom low-SESbackgrounds succeed in school
despite limits on local resources. Many current policies aim to help students who have
the wherewithal to seek out educational opportunity leave troubled schools or districts for
privately-run alternatives. In at least some instances– notably a subset of high-achieving
charter schools– students who win admissions lotteries realize large score gains. What
is unclear is the extent to which these policies are scalable: straightforward models of
economicbehaviorsuggestthatstudentswhodonotoptintohigh-achievingcharters would
beneﬁt less from attendance than those who do. Further, there may be negative spillovers
from from choice-based policies if the students who exercise choice no longer positively
inﬂuence those who do not, though empirical evidence suggests that these effects are not
large (Altonji et al. (2010)).
School construction differs from choice-based policies because students do not have to opt
in. With this in mind, the observed score gains may be even more impressive, because they
are not limited to students who express an interest in improving their academic outcomes.
The sticker price of school construction projects is much higher than the price of choice-
based reforms in almost every case. But, giventhe poor state of infrastructure in poor urban
districts, some school construction costs are ﬁxed in the sense that they must surely be
undertaken at some point in the relatively near future. At minimum, the results we present
here indicate that when this construction occurs, it should viewed not as an unfortunate
necessity but as key part of the broader school reform toolkit.
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Appendix A Descriptive Statistics
Table A -1: State of Service Systems in Connecticut Schools: Principals Survey
Less than good 2001 2009
Hartford 0.54 0.30
New Haven 0.53 0.14
Connecticut Average 0.32 0.18
Note: Percentages of school systems deemed ‘less than good’ in survey of public school principals. Cat-
egories include : Internal Communications , Interior Lighting, Technology Infrastructure, Exterior Lighting,
Air Conditioning, Roadways and Walks,Heating, Plumbing/Lavatories
(Scale: 4 = excellent, 3 = good, 2 = fair, 1 = poor, 0 = missing.)
Table A -2: School construction project summary
Number of schools Elem/MS HS




Expenditures (millions of 2005 dollars)
Mean 34.07 50.09
Median 37.60 48.35
75th percentile 40.60 64.07
25th percentile 29.79 35.16
Duration (in years)
Filing to occupancy 6.08 6.93
Construction to occupancy 1.74 2.64
Source: NHPS. Counts exclude transitional schools and count each school
address as a separate school.
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Table B -3: School enrollment by neighborhood
t − τo Enrolled Inﬂows Outﬂows New dist. New nbd. Leave dist. Leave nbd.
-5 0.0058 0.0071 0.0011 0.0088 0.0106 -0.0021 0.0095
0.0037 0.0064 0.0059 0.0078 0.0122 0.0077 0.0103
-4 0.0075** 0.0087 0.0056 0.0025 0.0115 0.0051 0.0083
0.0035 0.0061 0.0056 0.0074 0.0116 0.0073 0.0098
-3 0.0081** 0.0101 0.0108* 0.0081 0.0119 0.0047 0.0188*
0.0036 0.0062 0.0057 0.0075 0.0117 0.0074 0.0099
-2 0.0099** 0.0078 0.0068 0.0104 0.0113 -0.0018 0.0198*
0.0036 0.0065 0.0059 0.0079 0.0123 0.0077 0.0104
-1 0.0097** 0.006 0.0035 0.0047 -0.0051 -0.0041 0.0086
0.0039 0.0066 0.0061 0.0081 0.0126 0.008 0.0107
0 0.0172** 0.0181** 0.0089 0.0179* 0.0174 0.0017 0.0226*
0.0046 0.0078 0.0072 0.0096 0.0149 0.0094 0.0126
1 0.0228** 0.0210** 0.0043 0.0121 0.0339* 0.0058 0.003
0.0059 0.0102 0.0094 0.0125 0.0195 0.0123 0.0165
2 0.0295** 0.0332** 0.0064 0.0285** 0.024 0.0053 0.0064
0.0065 0.0113 0.0104 0.0138 0.0215 0.0136 0.0182
3 0.0344** 0.0357** 0.0253** 0.0384** 0.0385 0.018 0.0425**
0.0072 0.0126 0.0116 0.0154 0.024 0.0152 0.0203
4 0.0404** 0.0494** 0.0272* 0.0514** 0.0518* 0.0263 0.0304
0.009 0.0157 0.0144 0.0191 0.0298 0.0188 0.0251
5 0.0460** 0.0558** 0.0326** 0.0459** 0.0776** 0.0315 0.0426
0.0098 0.0171 0.0157 0.0209 0.0325 0.0205 0.0275
6 0.0441** 0.0671** 0.0497** 0.0565** 0.0855** 0.0494** 0.0602*
0.0112 0.0197 0.0181 0.0241 0.0375 0.0237 0.0317
N 200 175 175 175 175 175 175
N 200 175 175 175 175 175 175
Nbd. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: **: signiﬁcant at 5% level. *: signiﬁcant at 10% level. Effects of per-capita construction
expenditures by year relative to treatment on neighborhood-level log enrollment ﬂows. Observa-
tions are at the neighborhood year level. See section 6 for detailed explanation and deﬁnitions
.
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Appendix A Description of school construction projects.
This supplemental appendix describes two representative school construction projects. An
ofﬁcial description of the SCP as a whole and photographs of many of the new buildings
are available online at http://nhps.net/SchoolConstruction. The text quoted
here comes from a District-provided summary of SCP status as of May 2010.
The Fair Haven School at 164 Grand Avenue in New Haven was completed in 2004. The
changes at this school illustrate the SCP’s focus on improving the school environment and
community access as well as adding basic amenities like heat and air conditioning.
The District describes the improvements as follows.
• ‘When built in the late 1920s, this school provided an architectural anchor to the
neighborhood... its disrepair was extensive by the end of the century.’
• ‘[C]lassrooms were enlarged, updated to current technology standards, and, heating
and air conditioning were installed.’
• ‘The interior of the school has been completely reordered and the library, cafeteria,
and gymnasium repalced with those accessible to the students and the community.
[A]n addition was required to build a regulation size gymnasium.’
• ‘The light wells introduced natural light throughout the 4-story structure through
the skylights and the stairwells, and terminated in the newly designed and greatly
expanded library and cafeteria spaces at their bases. Each room, though located at
the center of the building, receives natural light from two wells.’
The Mauro-Sheridan School at 191 Fountain Street in New Haven was completed in 2009.
The changes at this school illustrate the ways in which the SCP improved students’ access
to technology. The District describes the changes as follows.
• ‘The 1954 addition has been demolished and a new addition built... The 1922 build-
ing has been renovated and features such diverse technology offerings as robotics,
high tech graphic arts studies, instrumental and electronic studies, as well as ad-
vanced computer studies.’
41• ‘The auditorium has been renovated as a ﬂat-ﬂoor, multipurpose music space... The
conversion of the balcony to a video lab allows for the recording of performances.’
• ‘[A] diverse technology curriculum includes: the NASA partnership (applied tech-
nology laboratory featuring mechanical design and robots); a video production lab
that supports literacy skills; a distance learning lab for interactive global learning;
computer labs; science labs; electronic music laboratories; and the integration of
technology throughout the building to enhance instruction.’
Appendix B Student selection
In this appendix we examine the relationship between selection into neighborhoods af-
fected by school construction and the observable determinants of student test scores. If
students moving into new neighborhoods are better students than the students there prior
to occupancy, we might attribute changes in mean school scores across time to school con-
struction when in fact they are a product of the changing student population. We address
this question by looking at how the characteristics of neighborhood populations relate to
time relative to occupancy.
To do this, we create an index of observable and predetermined characteristics weighted
by the role each plays in determining test scores, and document how this index varies with
time relative to treatment. We construct the index using the regression
Tigz = x
′
igβ + eigz, (Appendix B.1)
where xig is a vector consisting of dummies for race, sex, and free lunch status. We exclude
other observable characteristics like special education status and ELL status because these
are learning outcomes that could be endogenous to school construction. x′
ig ˆ β thus forms




ig ˆ β = γt + γz + γg + δ
selD(ℓ) + eizg. (Appendix B.2)
The γt are year ﬁxed effects, the γg are grade effects, and the γz are neighborhood ﬁxed
42effects. We do not correct our standard errors for sampling error in ˆ β,18 but do allow
arbitrary correlation in error terms within neighborhood-year cells. We graph our results in
Figure B -1. We ﬁnd that levels of observed selection on the reading and math indices are
close to zero and insigniﬁcant until one year post-occupancy. In that year, values of both
of the indices jump substantially, and the estimated coefﬁcient in the reading speciﬁcation
becomes statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level. The reading and math selection
indices both remain at high levels for several years, though estimates become noisy. As we
discuss in the main text, aggregating the year-speciﬁc effects into pre-and post-occupancy
groups yields a ﬁnding of statistically signiﬁcant post-occupancy selection in both reading
and math.
18Intuitively, correcting for sampling error could only reduce the statistical signiﬁcance of evidence for
selection. In practice we ﬁnd that such corrections have little effect because the β are tightly estimated.Figure B -1: Predicted Test Scores by Year Relative to Occupancy
Selection Effects - Reading























Selection Effects - Math























Note: Estimates of effects of per-capita school construction spending on indices of observable score deter-
minants by year relative to treatment, as described in equations C1 and C2. Shaded areas show a 90 percent
conﬁdence interval, allowing for clustered errors at the neighborhood-yearlevel.
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